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Access Governance

Microsoft Entra ID Governance provides the controls that determine who gets access, how that access is verified at provisioning time, how much standing privilege exists in the environment, and how external users are scoped and reviewed. Together these controls address the full identity lifecycle: onboarding, elevation, collaboration, and offboarding.


User Onboarding and Identity Verification

The Helpdesk Attack Surface

Deploying phishing-resistant authentication (passkeys, FIDO2 keys, certificate-based auth) removes the primary attack vector against end users. But it shifts attacker focus to the one flow that cannot require a hardware token: helpdesk provisioning and account recovery. Social engineering a helpdesk agent to issue a Temporary Access Pass or reset MFA enrollment is now the path of least resistance into a phishing-resistant tenant.

This is not theoretical. Microsoft's own analysis of identity attacks shows that after organizations deploy phishing-resistant MFA broadly, the next wave of attacks targets the provisioning workflow — impersonating employees, fabricating urgency ("I'm traveling and need my key replaced"), or exploiting gaps in identity verification procedures.

The technical countermeasure is to make the provisioning and recovery flows as rigorous as the authentication flow. Entra Verified ID and Face Check provide this for both initial onboarding and recovery scenarios.

Entra Verified ID and Face Check

Entra Verified ID is a decentralized identity framework based on W3C Verifiable Credentials. It allows a user to present a cryptographically signed credential — issued by a trusted verifier — to prove their identity without sharing the underlying document data with the relying party.

Face Check extends this with a real-time liveness check: the user presents a government-issued ID credential and performs a facial comparison against their Entra profile photo or the photo on the credential itself. This happens at onboarding or at MFA re-enrollment, not at every login.

The practical workflow for a new employee onboarding:

1. HR issues a Verified ID invite link to the new hire's personal email
2. New hire scans government ID (passport, driver's license) in the Microsoft Authenticator app
3. Identity verifier (Au10tix, IDEMIA, or TrueCredential) validates the document authenticity
and performs liveness detection
4. A signed Verifiable Credential is issued to the hire's Authenticator wallet
5. The hire presents this credential during account setup — before their corporate credentials exist
6. Entra accepts the credential as proof of identity; account is provisioned

At MFA re-enrollment (e.g., lost key, new device), the same Face Check flow can be required before a Temporary Access Pass is issued — eliminating the helpdesk social engineering vector entirely.

Identity Verifiers

Microsoft Entra Verified ID works with certified identity verification partners. Three are relevant for defense contractor and regulated commercial deployments:

VerifierStrengthsGCC High Available
Au10tixDocument authentication across 190+ countries; high-speed automated verification; proven in financial services and governmentYes
IDEMIADeep US government heritage (TSA PreCheck, DoD CAC programs); biometric accuracy; supports PIV/CAC credential linkageYes
TrueCredentialPurpose-built for Microsoft Entra Verified ID; native integration with Entra External ID and MyAccess workflowsYes

All three integrate with Entra via the Verified ID SDK. The verification result is returned as a claim in the Verified Credential — Entra can then gate account provisioning, TAP issuance, or access package assignment on a verified identity claim.

Inbound HR Provisioning

Automate account creation and deprovisioning by connecting your HR system of record to Entra via inbound provisioning:

HR SystemConnector
WorkdayEntra Workday Inbound Provisioning
SAP SuccessFactorsEntra SAP SuccessFactors Inbound Provisioning
Any HR system with a CSV/API exportEntra API-driven provisioning

The provisioning mapping determines which HR attributes flow into Entra: department, job title, manager, country, contract end date. Critically, map the worker type field (employee vs. contractor) — this drives group membership, license assignment, and whether Entitlement Management routes the user through a verification workflow.

Lifecycle Workflows automate the actions that accompany these HR events:

HR EventAutomated Action
New hire createdSend welcome email; assign licenses; add to onboarding groups; trigger Verified ID enrollment
Transfer (department/role change)Remove old group memberships; add new groups; trigger access review for changed access
TerminationDisable account; revoke sessions; remove group memberships; remove licenses; retain account for 30 days for audit
Contract end date reachedSame as termination — triggered by contractEndDate attribute from HR system

US Person Verification

CMMC requires that access to CUI be limited to authorized users. For defense contractors, "authorized" often has an additional constraint: US Persons only. This is not directly enforced by Entra, but the combination of Verified ID (government document verification) and HR provisioning attributes (employeeCountry, citizenship) creates an auditable basis for US Person access controls.

Implement a Conditional Access policy that requires membership in an sg-us-persons security group as a condition for accessing CUI-scoped applications. Maintain group membership via HR provisioning — only employees with citizenship = US or workAuthorization = US Person in the HR system flow into this group automatically.

The Face Check / IDEMIA verification at onboarding provides the government document basis for that HR attribute — creating a defensible chain: government-verified ID → HR attribute → security group → Conditional Access → CUI access.

CMMC Control Mapping

NIST ControlEntra Governance Capability
3.1.1 — Limit access to authorized usersHR provisioning + Lifecycle Workflows enforce account existence only for active personnel
3.1.2 — Limit access to authorized processesEntitlement Management scopes access packages to verified user populations
3.9.1 — Screen individuals before accessVerified ID + Face Check provides government document-backed identity verification at onboarding
3.9.2 — Terminate access upon separationLifecycle Workflow on HR termination event; revokes sessions within minutes of HR record update

Privileged Identity Management

Standing administrative access — accounts that are always Global Administrator, always Exchange Administrator, always have write access to production — is the single largest blast radius risk in any M365 tenant. A compromised credential with standing Global Admin access compromises the entire tenant immediately. Privileged Identity Management (PIM) eliminates standing access by replacing it with time-bound, approval-gated, just-in-time elevation.

Eligible vs. Active Assignments

The core PIM concept is the distinction between eligible and active assignments:

Assignment TypeWhat It MeansWhen to Use
EligibleThe user can activate the role but does not hold it permanently. Activation requires MFA, optional approval, and produces an audit record.All privileged roles for named admins
ActiveThe user holds the role permanently. No activation step required.Break-glass accounts only; emergency access only
Active (time-bound)Active assignment that expires after a set duration.Temporary elevated access for a project or audit period

The goal is zero standing active assignments for any role that can modify security configuration, add credentials to accounts, or access sensitive data at scale.

Roles That Must Be PIM-Gated

In a CMMC environment, the following roles must have no standing active assignments — all named admins must be eligible only:

RoleBlast Radius if Compromised
Global AdministratorFull tenant takeover
Privileged Role AdministratorCan assign any role, including Global Admin
Security AdministratorCan modify Conditional Access, disable MFA
User Access AdministratorCan grant any Azure RBAC role
Exchange AdministratorFull mailbox access across all users
SharePoint AdministratorFull document library access
Intune AdministratorCan push malicious device configurations
Application AdministratorCan add credentials to any app registration
Authentication AdministratorCan reset MFA for non-privileged users

Active (standing) assignments should exist only for break-glass accounts — two or more cloud-only accounts with Global Admin, excluded from all Conditional Access policies, credentials stored in a physical safe, and monitored for any sign-in via an Azure Monitor alert.

CMMC Control Mapping

NIST ControlPIM Capability
3.1.5 — Least privilegeEligible-only assignments; no standing admin access
3.1.6 — Non-privileged accounts for non-privileged functionsPIM requires separate activation step — admins use standard account for daily work
3.1.15 — Privileged remote accessPIM activation requires phishing-resistant MFA; activation is logged in Entra audit log
3.3.1 — Audit recordsEvery PIM activation generates an audit log entry: who activated, which role, duration, justification
3.3.2 — Audit reviewPIM alerts on activation of high-sensitivity roles; integrate with Sentinel for SOC review

PIM Activation Settings

Configure these settings per role in Entra ID → Identity Governance → Privileged Identity Management → Entra ID roles → [Role] → Settings:

SettingRecommended Value
Maximum activation duration4 hours (Global Admin); 8 hours (workload-specific roles)
Require MFA on activationYes — phishing-resistant method required
Require justification on activationYes — justification text written to audit log
Require approvalYes for Global Admin and Privileged Role Admin; No for workload roles (reduces friction)
ApproversSecurity team lead; at least two approvers configured so no single person is a bottleneck
Send notificationsYes — email to approvers and role owners on every activation

Access Reviews for Privileged Roles

PIM eligible assignments should be reviewed quarterly. Configure Access Reviews in Entra ID Governance:

  1. Entra ID → Identity Governance → Access reviews → New access review
  2. Scope: Team + Application → Entra ID roles → select all roles with eligible assignments
  3. Reviewers: Manager of each user (or designated Security Officer if manager is not appropriate)
  4. Recurrence: Quarterly
  5. Upon completion: Auto-remove access if reviewer does not respond (deny-by-default)

The access review report is direct evidence for compliance assessors and auditors reviewing privilege management controls.

PIM for Azure Resource Roles

PIM also covers Azure RBAC roles on Azure Government subscriptions — not just Entra directory roles. Apply the same eligible-only policy to:

  • Owner on any subscription containing session hosts, storage accounts, or Key Vault instances
  • Contributor on resource groups containing sensitive workloads
  • Key Vault Administrator on any Key Vault holding tenant encryption keys

Entitlement Management

Entitlement Management governs what access a user can request, who approves it, how long it lasts, and who reviews it periodically. It is particularly important for external users — contractors, auditors, partner personnel — who need access to specific resources but must not have the ability to self-provision broader access.

Access Packages

An access package bundles the resources a role needs — SharePoint sites, Teams, application roles, security groups — into a single requestable unit. A contractor working on a specific contract vehicle gets one access package; a government auditor gets a different, more restricted one.

Access package components:

ComponentWhat It Controls
Resource rolesSharePoint site access level, Team membership, app role assignments
PolicyWho can request, who approves, how long access lasts
LifecycleExpiration date; access review schedule; auto-extend or auto-expire
CatalogOrganizational grouping of packages (e.g., "Project Resources", "IT Operations")

External User Access Packages

The most important use case for Entitlement Management in a regulated environment is controlling the external user lifecycle. Without it, B2B guests can be invited by any member, accumulate access over time, and remain in the tenant indefinitely after their engagement ends.

With Entitlement Management:

  1. External users can only gain access via a sponsored access package request — no ad-hoc invitations permitted (enforced via Entra External Collaboration Settings → restrict invitations to admins only)
  2. The access package policy specifies the exact resources the external user will receive — not broader SharePoint or Teams access
  3. Access expires automatically at the contract end date — no manual cleanup required
  4. An access review fires 30 days before expiration — the sponsor confirms whether access should be extended
  5. If the sponsor does not respond, access is removed automatically

CUI-Scoped External Access

For CMMC environments, external access packages should be scoped to the minimum resources needed for the contract scope:

External User TypeAccess Package ContentsMax Duration
Subcontractor (active contract)Tented SharePoint site (CUI-Basic label); Teams channelContract end date
Government auditor / DCSA assessorRead-only SharePoint site; no Teams90 days
Prime contractor program officeSpecific document library; no email accessContract period
Technical reviewerSingle SharePoint document library; view-only30 days

Configure the access package policy to require connected organization approval — the external user's organization must be a pre-approved connected organization in Entra External Identities before their request can be submitted. This is the Entitlement Management equivalent of the DLP Allowed Domains list: only known partner tenants can request access.

Restricting Ad-Hoc Guest Invitations

In Entra ID → External Identities → External collaboration settings:

  • Guest invite settings: set to Only users assigned to specific admin roles can invite (or No one in the organization can invite)
  • This forces all external access through Entitlement Management access packages — no backdoor invitations

CMMC Control Mapping

NIST ControlEntitlement Management Capability
3.1.1 — Limit access to authorized usersAccess packages define the exact resources; auto-expiry removes access when engagement ends
3.1.2 — Limit access to authorized processesPackage scope limits external users to specific sites/teams — not tenant-wide access
3.1.3 — Control CUI flowExternal packages scoped to CUI-labeled containers; combined with DLP Allowed Domains
3.9.2 — Terminate accessAuto-expiry on contract end date; access review 30 days prior

Access Reviews for External Users

Configure a recurring access review specifically for external users with active access packages:

  1. Scope: All guest users across all catalogs
  2. Reviewers: Package sponsors (the internal employee who requested or approved the external access)
  3. Recurrence: Quarterly (or at contract expiry — whichever is sooner)
  4. Decisions: Approve to extend; Deny to remove; No response → auto-deny
  5. Notifications: Remind reviewers 7 days and 2 days before deadline

The access review completion report — including sponsor decisions and auto-denials — is direct audit evidence for compliance reviewers and auditors.

My Access Portal

myaccess.microsoft.com (commercial) / myaccess.microsoft.us (GCC High) is the self-service portal where users request access packages, view their current access, and extend or return access. For external users, the access package request link can be shared directly — the external user authenticates with their own organizational credentials and submits the request, which routes to the configured approvers without requiring IT involvement.

This eliminates the IT ticket workflow for access provisioning while maintaining full approval and audit trail.

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